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ABSTRACT

Decision making often entails conflict. In many situations, the symptoms of such decisional
conflict are conspicuous. This paper explores an important and unexamined question: How does
observing someone else experiencing decisional conflict impact our own preferences? The
authors show that observing others’ emotional conflict and agony over an impending decision
makes the observer’s preferences converge to those of the conflicted actor (i.e., choose
similarly). Thus, this paper contributes to the social influence literature by demonstrating that
observers’ preferences are not only influenced by an actor’s ultimate choice, but also by the
process leading to this choice. For example, in one experiment, participants' real monetary
donations to one of two charities converged to those of a paid confederate that agonized over the
decision. Six studies demonstrate this effect and show that it is triggered by empathy and a
greater sense of shared identity with the conflicted actor. Accordingly, the studies show the
effect is more pronounced for individuals with a greater tendency to empathize with others, and
that convergence occurs only if participants deem the actor’s conflict warranted given the
decision at hand. The authors also demonstrate important implications of this effect in contexts
of group decision-making.

Keywords: social influence, conflict, empathy, shared identity, preferences
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Choice conflict is often a central component of the decision-making process. This paper

explores a straightforward yet important and unexamined question: How does observing
someone else experiencing emotional conflict over an impending decision impact our own
preferences? Would we be more likely to choose similarly to or differently from another
individual after observing this person’s pain and agony over the decision? Indeed, understanding
how other peoples’ choices influence our own decisions is important in many domains and
contexts. A vast body of literature has studied social influence and how the behavior of others
shapes our own actions and attitudes (see Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004, for a review). However,
although social psychology has long explored the factors that motivate individuals to converge
to, or diverge from, the behavior of others, the field has largely ignored how and why observing
the choice process of others (e.g., their experienced emotional conflict in choice) may affect the
observer’s own preferences. Thus, this paper contributes to the social influence literature by
demonstrating that observers’ preferences are not only influenced by an actor’s ultimate choice,
but also by the process through which this choice is made. In particular, we hypothesize that
observing others’ choice conflict—a central and often conspicuous element of the decisionmaking process—increases the likelihood that the observer’s preferences will converge to those
of the actor’s.
In this paper, we advance an emotion-based mechanism underlying the effect.
Specifically, as social creatures, we are attuned to those around us and to their emotional states.
Integrating literature on empathy and shared identity, we argue that observing others in “pain and
agony” over an impending decision triggers empathic reactions that make the observer feel a
greater sense of shared identity with the conflicted actor. Such a sense of shared identity leads
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the observer to choose more similarly to the conflicted actor (i.e., convergence of preference).
Figure 1 summarizes the suggested theoretical framework and main hypotheses.

FIGURE 1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
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Observed
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Shared Identity

+

Preference
Convergence

Admittedly, one could also advance an account that involves inferential processes. For
example, one could argue that observing a conflicted actor may signal to the observer that the
actor conducted a more thoughtful and diligent choice process and therefore must have made a
better choice (e.g., Rucker, Petty, and Briñol, 2008; Schrift, Netzer, and Kivetz, 2011).
According to this account, convergence of preferences will occur through inferential processes,
which may involve following descriptive norms (e.g., Cialdini, Reno, and Kallgren 1990).
However, an inferential process may also lead to opposite predictions. That is, the observer
might interpret the actor’s conflict as a sign of confusion, incompetency, or perhaps unfamiliarity
with the decision domain. This reasoning should cause the observer to question the decision
quality and gravitate away from the conflicted actor’s choice (i.e., preference divergence).
Although we agree these types of inferential processes are pertinent in some instances,
they may have a smaller role in other instances. For example, in decisions that inherently involve
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subjective preferences and personal tastes, the notion of a “better” or an “accurate” decision
becomes less relevant. The fact that an individual is either thoughtful or confused about these
types of decisions should not necessarily inform the observer about the best course of action,
because “best” is highly subjective and governed by personal taste and heterogeneity in
preferences. We argue that in such instances, a different mechanism, which is separate and
distinct, may become more relevant. Throughout the studies, we control for the aforementioned
inferential processes and isolate and test the suggested emotion-based account.
In addition to the theoretical significance, this research question is important from a
practical perspective. Specifically, in many instances, individuals can directly observe (in real
time) other people, such as friends, colleagues, managers, or even strangers at a store,
experiencing conflict when facing important decisions. In other instances, experienced conflict
may be inferred or learned post-hoc either directly (e.g., a friend tells us about a difficult
decision he or she experienced) or indirectly through blogs, reviews, or other means of
communication. Other situations that involve group interactions, such as jury decision making
(e.g., Devine et al. 2000; Kaplan 1987) or instances in which group members voice their own
opinions sequentially (e.g., Arieli and Levav 2000), may provide decision makers with cues to
the level of conflict group members experience. Thus, studying how preferences are shaped
when people learn, observe, or even imagine decisional conflicts that others experience has
important practical implications.
Recent research lends support to the notion that observing or learning about different
elements in others’ decision processes may affect people’s judgments. For example, Critcher,
Inbar, and Pizarro (2013) showed that the speed with which an actor made either a moral or
immoral decision influenced how others judged this actor’s moral character. Lamberton, Naylor,
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and Haws (2013) found that learning about the reasoning that governed an actor’s choice could
significantly affect the observer’s confidence when making (and publicly discussing) a similar
choice. Kupor et al. (2014) reported that the perceived thoughtfulness with which an actor made
a decision affected the observer’s evaluation of the actor as well as openness to being influenced.
Thus, emerging and recent research underscores the importance of studying and understanding
different elements of the decision process when examining social influence.
In what follows, we develop our theoretical framework following each of the three links
depicted in Figure 1, namely, (i) decisional conflict and empathy, (ii) empathy and shared
identity, and (iii) shared identity and preference convergence. We then report six studies that
explore how others’ decisional conflicts influence the observers’ preferences through empathic
reactions and a greater sense of shared identity. We conclude by discussing the contribution of
this research and suggest directions for future research.

THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT

Observed Conflict and Empathic Reactions
Earlier research that laid down the laws of conflict behavior viewed conflict as a situation
in which two or more incompatible responses are aroused simultaneously in an organism (Miller
1944; Berlyne 1960). Accordingly, studies showed that experiencing conflict in choice often
produced negative emotional states, such as psychological stress, anxiety, discomfort, agitation,
and anticipated regret (e.g., Armitage and Arden 2007; Barker 1942; Baron and Spranca 1997;
Beattie et al. 1994; Janis and Mann 1976; Lewin 1951; Luce, Bettman, and Payne 2001; Miller
1944; Simonson 1992; Zeelenberg 1999). Researchers also explored and documented other
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concomitants of decisional conflict, such as marked changes in heart rate, finger-pulse
amplitude, galvanic skin response, reaction time, eye movements, and hesitancy in response
(e.g., Barker 1942; Bergum and Dooley 1969; Cattell 1902; Gerard 1967; Harreveld et al. 2009;
Jones and Johnson 1973; Mann, Janis, and Chaplin 1969). Indeed, many of the indications for
decisional conflict are conspicuous. Thus, people may often observe, infer, and learn others’
experienced conflict and its corresponding emotional states through direct verbal indications as
well as nonverbal communication such as facial expressions and body language (e.g., Ekman
1993; Keltner at al. 2003).
Because decisional conflict often involves conspicuous negative emotional states, and
past research shows that observing the suffering of others often triggers empathy, we argue that
observing others going through the “pain and agony” of choice will trigger empathic reactions.
Empathy, in its broadest sense, refers to an individual’s reaction to the experience of another
individual (Davis 1983) and has been studied from evolutionary, developmental, social, and
neuroscience perspectives (Decety and Jackson 2004). Ickes (1997) defines empathy as a
complex form of psychological inference in which observation, memory, knowledge, and
reasoning collectively produce insights into the emotional states and thoughts of others. As such,
empathy involves both an affective component, which is more visceral, (i.e., sharing others’
emotional state), and a cognitive component (i.e., taking the perspective of others). Not
surprisingly, the origin of the word empathy comes from the integration of the two Greek words
em, which means “in,” and pathos, which means “feeling.” Thus, it captures the process by
which we vicariously experience others’ internal states as our own (Feshbach 1978; Hoffman
1985). As Decety and Jackson (2004) noted, “This natural ability to understand the emotions and
feelings of others, whether one actually witnessed his or her situation, perceived it from a
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photograph, read about it in a fiction book, or merely imagined it, refers to the phenomenological
experience of empathy.”
Although empathic reactions are complex, they are primal and spontaneous.
Developmental researchers have documented that even young infants are sensitive to others’
emotional states, and are predisposed to and capable of emotional resonance, which are
important precursors of empathy (Decety and Jackson 2004; Hoffman 2001; Trevarthen 1979).
Studies demonstrate that by the age of two, children manifest empathic reactions toward others
in distress through behaviors such as helping, sharing, and comforting, (e.g., Bretherton et al.
1986; Feshbach and Roe 1968).
The literature concerning pro-social behavior has also extensively studied empathy (e.g.,
Batson et al. 1997; Cialdini et al. 1997) and documented how learning, inferring, or directly
observing others’ misfortunates triggers empathic reactions. We argue that such empathic
reactions would generalize to decision-making contexts. Specifically, because decision makers’
conflict and attitude ambivalence are often accompanied by negative emotional states, which
others may observe or infer, we expect they would also produce empathy toward the conflicted
actor. Thus, we hypothesize that individuals who observe, infer, or learn about an actor’s
emotional conflict and “pain” over an impending decision will tend to take the perspective of the
actor and resonate with the actor’s emotional state.

Empathy and Shared Identity
Because empathic reactions entail sharing others’ emotional states and taking their
perspective, understanding how such reactions could also influence the observer’s self-other
representations is important. Several streams of literature suggest that when empathizing with
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others, individuals tend to generate mental and cognitive representations of others that
considerably overlap with their own self-representations. This notion of shared identity (also
termed as “oneness;” Cialdini et al. 1997) is built on the view that the self-concept is dynamic
and malleable (e.g., Higgins 1996; Kihlstrom and Cantor 1984) and can shift temporarily to
include others (e.g., Aron and Aron 1986; Hornstein 1978). Accordingly, researchers have
suggested that when one vicariously experiences what another is experiencing, the self is
incorporated within the boundary of the other and can include a form of psychological
indistinguishability and blur self-other distinctions (Cialdini et al. 1997; Neuberg et al. 1997;
Wegner 1980; Lerner 1980).
Research on perspective taking (e.g., Davis et al. 1996; Galinsky and Moskowitz 2000)
and emotional contagion (e.g., Hatfield, Cacioppo, and Rapson 1993; Howard and Gengler 2001)
lends support to this link between empathic reactions and shared identity. For example, Davis et
al. (1996) found that taking the perspective of others (an integral part of empathy) influences
individuals’ mental representations, and causes them to see more of themselves in the other.
Specifically, participants that were instructed to take the perspective of a stranger that
experienced certain difficulties in life attributed a greater proportion of their self-descriptors
(e.g., traits) to this individual. As Davis et al. (1996) noted, “The mental processes associated
with perspective taking cause an observer's thoughts and feelings about a target to become, in
some sense, more ‘selflike’… the effect of active perspective taking will be to create a merging
of self and other.”
Note that whereas Aron et al. (1991) mainly focused on how people with whom we have
close relationships (e.g., spouse and family) come over time to be “included within the self,”
Davis et al. (1996) explored and demonstrated that taking the perspective of even a stranger
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triggers self-other merging. Indeed, like research concerning pro-social behavior demonstrated,
empathic reactions are not limited to cases in which the observer and target are in a close
relationship (e.g., Bagozzi and Moore 1994; Coke, Batson and McDavis 1978; Small and
Loewenstein 2003). More importantly, this literature lends further support to the notion that
empathy triggers self-other merging. In particular, Cialdini et al. (1997) suggested and found that
empathy-induced helping behavior occurs as a result of self-other merging. This finding sparked
a debate concerning the empathy-altruism model, and whether helping behavior is driven by a
non-altruistic factor (e.g., Batson et al. 1997; Neuberg et al. 1997). Cialdini et al. (1997) noted,
“After all, as the self and other increasingly merge, helping the other increasingly helps the
self…our findings suggest that empathic concern may have only appeared to mediate aid in
much prior research because it is a concomitant of perceived oneness, a construct that offers a
non-altruistic path to such aid.”
Additional evidence for the link between empathy and shared identity is apparent in the
field of neuroscience (see Decety and Jackson, 2004, for a review on the functional architecture
of human empathy). Several investigations support the notion that perception of a given behavior
in another individual automatically activates one’s own representations of that behavior (Preston
and de Waal 2002; Prinz 1997). According to Decety and Jackson (2004), such a view of shared
representations (Decety and Sommerville 2003; Jeannerod 1999) is grounded in the fundamental
physiological properties of the nervous system regarding action-cognition continuity.
Neuroimaging studies of pain have documented a neural overlap between observing and
evaluating pain when taking others’ perspectives and when taking a self-perspective (Botvinick
et al. 2005; Jackson et al. 2004; Singer et al. 2004). That is, observing others in pain and being
asked to assess their own pain activated similar regions of the brain. Decety and Jackson (2004)
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concluded that these findings suggest that part of the neural network mediating pain experience
is shared when empathizing with others experiencing pain.
To summarize, several streams of literature support the link between these two distinct
constructs, namely, empathy and shared identity. Accordingly, we hypothesize that the
observer’s empathic reactions toward a conflicted actor will trigger a greater sense of shared
identity; this shared identity will lead the observer to see the actor in a more “self-like” manner.
However, a central question still remains: Why would a greater sense of shared identity
ultimately lead to preference convergence?

Shared Identity and Preference Convergence
As noted earlier, the notion of shared identity is conceptualized as individuals having
overlapping mental representations. Such shared representations can lead people to confuse
cognitions about the self with cognitions about close others (Aaron et al. 1991; Coats et al. 2000;
Smith, Coats, and Walling 1999) and influence their perceptions of their own attributes and traits
as being shared with those of others (Davis, et al. 1996; De Cremer 2004; Galinsky and
Moskowitz 2000; Goldstein and Cialdini 2007a).
Goldstein and Cialdini (2007a) experimentally triggered a greater sense of shared identity
between participant and actor (through perspective-taking instructions or by providing bogus
feedback about overlapping brainwaves). After observing the actor behaving in a certain manner,
participants incorporated attributes relevant to the actor’s behavior into their own self-concept
and exhibited more congruent behavior. The researchers advanced a self-perception account
(Bem 1967) and argued that observing a close other behave in a certain way informed observers
about their own traits and attitudes as if they themselves had engaged in this behavior.
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Consistent with these findings, we argue that through an emotional resonance with a

conflicted actor, individuals will feel a greater sense of shared identity. That is, they will see the
actor in a more self-like manner. Then, after learning about the actor’s final choice, the observers
will inform themselves about their own preferences (as though they themselves made the
choice). Consequently, this process would make the observer more likely to choose like the
conflicted actor (i.e., converge in preferences).
In what follows, we report a series of six studies that test the main hypotheses and the
underlying psychological mechanism (an additional study is reported in Appendix G). Because
decisional conflict could manifest itself in many ways, throughout these studies, we manipulate
the observed/inferred decisional conflict in numerous ways (e.g., real-life behaviors, verbal
communication, facial expressions, reflection manipulation, and direct communications).
In Study 1, we test our hypothesis in a realistic setting that involves paid actors
(confederates) who exhibit high versus low decisional conflict over an impending real and
consequential decision (which of two charities to donate to). We find that, when asked to make a
similar decision, observers are more likely to donate to the charity chosen by the conflicted (as
opposed to non-conflicted) actor. In Study 2, we use pictures of facial expressions to manipulate
the observed conflict and test the first link of our theoretical model (i.e., the role of empathy as a
driver of the effect). If empathic reactions indeed mediate the effect, the effect should be more
pronounced for individuals’ with a stronger tendency to empathize with others. Accordingly, we
measure participants’ innate tendency to empathize with others, and demonstrate its moderating
role. In Study 3, we employ a multi-step mediation analysis and test the entire path of the
suggested mechanism (as depicted in Figure 1): observed conflict [X] leads to empathic reactions
[M1], which leads to a greater sense of shared identity [M2], which leads to convergence [Y].
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Whereas Studies 2 and 3 provide support for the suggested emotion-based account,

Studies 4a and 4b directly rule out inferential processes as the main driver. In particular, these
studies demonstrate the effect persists also in situations that render such inferences completely
irrelevant (i.e., in scenarios that involve random outcomes, e.g., lotteries). Further, Study 4b
shows that convergence of preferences occur only when the observer can indeed empathize with
the actor. When the actor’s conflict does not trigger empathy (i.e., when the observer deems the
actor’s conflict inappropriate for the decision at hand), convergence is attenuated.
Study 5 examines how the proposed effect could shape an individual’s preferences in a
group decision-making context. We find that the experienced conflict of a teammate influences
participants’ real and consequential monetary decisions (in a group version of the ultimatum
game). Finally, in Appendix G, we report an additional study (Study 6) that explores
convergence of preferences in the product-attribute space (i.e., attribute weights). This study
increases the convergent evidence by employing a different paradigm, and also allows us to test
and rule out an additional rival account.

STUDY 1 – PREFERENCE CONVERGENCE IN REAL DONATION DECISIONS

The main purpose of this study was to examine, in a relatively realistic setting, whether
observing an actor’s decisional conflict over which charity to donate to would affect the
observer’s preferences. We asked participants to make real monetary donations after observing a
paid confederate display either high or low decision conflict while making a similar decision. We
predicted the participants’ choice of a charity would converge to that of the confederate when the
latter portrayed high conflict during deliberations over the impending decision.
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The second goal of this study was to provide initial evidence for the proposed mechanism

while maintaining the realism of the study. To do so, we measured participants’ preferred
interpersonal distance from the confederate after they observed the confederate’s deliberations
and choice. Previous literature has found that interpersonal distance (often operationalized by
seating distance) is negatively correlated with empathic reactions (e.g., Bryant, 1982; Guardo
1969; Strayer and Roberts 1997) and thus can serve as a subtle proxy for the observer’s empathic
response toward the confederate.

Method
We recruited 100 undergraduate students from a private college in Israel to participate in
the experiment as part of their course requirements. After completing an unrelated study,
participants received additional monetary compensation and were told they would be asked to
donate this money to one of two charities (because of the elaborate design, we tested each
subject separately). Each subject was directed to a room in which an experimenter and a
confederate sat on opposite sides of a table. The subject was then asked to sit on a chair in the
corner of the room and wait until it was his or her turn to choose a charity (Figure 2 depicts the
layout of the room and location of the experimenter, confederate, and subject). The confederate
was ostensibly a student participating in the study and was conspicuously asked to decide to
which of two charities to donate 19 New Israeli Shekels (NIS), an amount roughly equivalent to
US$5.50. Two boxes were positioned on the table, each of which was labeled with the name and
logo of a specific charity and sealed so that participants could not see the amounts that had
already been donated to each charity. Before allowing the confederate to decide which charity to
donate to, the experimenter described the two charities such that both the confederate and the
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subject could hear, and mentioned that participants could allocate the 19 NIS coins between the
two charities as they pleased. Because the participants were asked to donate an uneven number
of shekels, they could not split the money evenly between the two charities, thereby forcing them
to decide which of the two charities would receive the greater amount. The two charities were
distinguishable in that one was positioned around assisting with health issues and the second was
positioned around vital day-to-day necessities. All of the collected donations were eventually
given to the target charities according to participants’ allocations.
We randomly assigned participants to one of two conditions. In the high-conflict
condition, the confederate clearly demonstrated the choice of charity was extremely conflicting
and difficult to make. The confederate followed a script and mentioned out loud that making this
decision was very hard and that he was not sure how to decide. The confederate also
accompanied these statements with body language that conveyed agony over the decision.
Finally, after roughly one minute, the confederate made his allocation. In the low-conflict
condition, the confederate clearly demonstrated the decision was quite easy and not very
conflicting. The script in the low-conflict condition involved sentences such as “This is an easy
decision for me,” accompanied by corresponding body language and a relatively short decision
time (roughly 10 seconds). In both conditions, the confederate eventually donated the full
amount (19 NIS) to a single charity (the choice of which was counterbalanced).
Once the confederate finalized the choice and inserted the donation into the charity box,
the experimenter asked the confederate to complete a general information sheet to conclude the
study, and then instructed the subject to grab the chair and join the experimenter at the table. The
subject pulled the chair to the table and sat in front of the experimenter on the same side of the
table where the confederate was sitting (see Figure 2 stage 2).
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FIGURE 2. STUDY 1: ROOM LAYOUT AND ESTIMATED LOCATION OF INDIVIDUALS
AT DIFFERENT STAGES IN THE STUDY

Distance between
confederate’s and
subject’s chairs

Confederate
Experimenter
Subject

2
Stage 2:
after subject
approached the table

1
Stage 1:
before subject
approached the table

Next, the experimenter reiterated the instructions to the subject, during which time the
confederate finished filling out the information sheet, was thanked, and left the room. The
subject then received the remaining instructions and made his or her decision without the
confederate being present, thus eliminating rival accounts pertaining to possible convergence due
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to emotional support and solidarity with the conflicted actor. The experimenter recorded how the
subject decided to allocate the 19 NIS between the two charities, asked the subject to complete
the general information sheet, and finally thanked and informed the subject that the study was
over. After the subject left the room, the experimenter measured (using a tape measure) how
close the subject had placed the chair next to the confederate’s chair.
Previous studies have used seating distance as a measure of preferred interpersonal
distance (e.g., Ashton-James et al. 2007; Gifford and O’Connor 1987; Holland et al. 2004).
Directly related to our hypothesis, research has also shown that interpersonal distance (often
operationalized by seating distance) is negatively correlated with empathic reactions (e.g., Bryant
1982; Guardo 1969; Strayer and Roberts 1997). For example, Strayer and Roberts (1997) found
that children who empathized with a certain individual tended to seek physical closeness to this
individual. Because an important goal of this study was to explore the effect in a realistic setting,
in our view, this measure (although potentially noisy) seemed to serve as a subtle and potentially
satisfactory proxy for an observer’s empathic reactions toward the confederate.

Results
Donation Decision. The amount of money, between 0 and 19 NIS, that the subject
decided to donate to the charity that the confederate chose served as the dependent variable:
larger numbers indicate greater convergence with the confederate’s preferences. A nonparametric test revealed that participants who observed the confederate experiencing greater
decisional conflict (high-conflict condition) tended to donate more to the confederate’s choice
(Mhigh-conflict = 12.53 NIS) than participants assigned to the low-conflict condition (Mlow-conflict =
8.8 NIS; Mann-Whitney U = 768.5, p < .001). Examining the distribution of responses, we found
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that 82% of subjects assigned to the high-conflict condition donated more to the confederate’s
choice of charity, compared to only 54% of subjects assigned to the low-conflict condition (χ2(1)
= 9.01, p < .005). An odds-ratio analysis indicated participants in the high-conflict condition
were 3.88 times more likely to donate more money to the confederate’s choice of charity.
Because the confederate’s choice of charity was counterbalanced, one could also test
whether convergence of preferences in the high-conflict condition or, alternatively, divergence in
the low-conflict condition, was the primary driver of the difference in donation amounts to the
confederate’s choice of charity. Testing the donation amounts in the two conditions against 9.5
(which is half the amount that could be donated) supported the hypothesis that convergence
occurred. In particular, the amount donated to the confederate’s choice of charity was
significantly different from 9.5 in the high-conflict condition (t(49) = 3.45, p < .001) but not in
the low-conflict condition (t(49) = -.865, p > .39).
Empathy. The distance between the confederate’s and the subject’s chairs served as a
measure of empathic reactions toward the confederate. As expected, participants in the highconflict condition placed their chair closer to the confederate (M = 149.5 cm) than participants in
the low-conflict condition (M = 197.5 cm; F(1,98) = 36.92; p < .001).
Mediation Analysis. The data were submitted to a mediation analysis (using model 4 of
the macro PROCESS, Hayes 2013). The dependent variable was the amount of money donated
to the confederate’s chosen charity, the potential mediator was the distance between the subject’s
and confederate’s chairs, and the independent variable was the confederate’s decisional conflict
(low vs. high conflict). The experiment employed two different confederates (randomly assigned
between conditions), a variable that we included as a covariate in this analysis. The 95% Monte
Carlo confidence interval generated using 10,000 bootstrap samples estimated the mediating role
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of distance on the relation between observed conflict and preference convergence (B = 1.19;
CI95% = -0.24 to 2.81). Although the estimated effect was positive, the tail of the 95% confidence
interval included zero, thus indicating the mediation only approached significance. However,
given the nature of the measurement used (distance between chairs after both the confederate and
subject left the lab) and that this measurement was merely a proxy for the mediator, it is
reasonable that it was noisy and difficult to trace. The 90% confidence interval did not include
zero (B = 1.19; CI90% = .013 to 2.48).

Discussion
This study demonstrates, in a relatively realistic setting, that observing others conflicted
about their choice can affect the observer’s preferences. Participants who observed actors
conflicted about their decision tended to exhibit preferences consistent with those of the actor;
that is, they were more likely to donate to the same charity. As a subtle proxy for empathy, we
examined how close participants chose to sit next to the conflicted or non-conflicted actor. We
found this proxy mediated the impact of the actor’s decisional conflict on preference
convergence, providing suggestive evidence (though far from conclusive) that supports the
underlying mechanism. The next study tests the role of empathy more directly. In particular, we
show that individuals with a greater innate tendency to empathize with others exhibit greater
convergence to the preferences of a conflicted actor.
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STUDY 2 – OBSERVED CONFLICT AND THE ROLE OF EMPATHY

In Study 2, participants read a short scenario about a dilemma that an actor was facing,
and also learned about the degree of decisional conflict this actor experienced. To manipulate
conflict, we showed participants pretested pictures of different facial expressions of a decision
maker, ostensibly taken while deliberating her choice. We decided to use facial expressions to
manipulate perceived emotional conflict, because these are considered a central channel for
communicating emotions and are often conspicuous (Ekman 1993; Small and Verrochi 2009).
We predicted that a cue about the actor’s high decisional conflict would trigger empathic
reactions, and consequently lead the observer’s preferences to converge to those of the actor.
Importantly, if preference convergence occurs as a result of an empathic response, the effect
should be more pronounced for individuals with a greater innate tendency to empathize with
others. Accordingly, we measured individuals’ tendency to empathize with others and predicted
it would moderate the effect.
To address rival accounts, we thoroughly pretested the pictures employed in the main
study and validated that the facial expressions elicited perceptions of greater conflict but not
perceptions of greater attentiveness or thoughtfulness with respect to the impending decision (the
pictures and full description of the pretest are available in Appendix A).

Method
We recruited 450 paid, online subjects to participate in the study (17 of whom had
incomplete responses and were therefore eliminated from the analyses). Participants read a short
scenario about a dilemma that a woman faces: which of two important events to attend (attending
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her best friend’s wedding or her sister’s bachelorette party). The scenario also mentioned that a
scheduling conflict prevented her from attending both. We randomly assigned participants to one
of three conditions: strong conflict cue, weak conflict cue, and no cue. In the strong and weak
conflict cue conditions, participants observed the corresponding pictures from the pretest
ostensibly taken during the actor’s deliberation over her decision (attend her best friend’s
wedding or her sister’s bachelorette party). As detailed in the pretest (Appendix A), the pictures
were of the same person and did not differ in how thoughtful or attentive this person was
perceived to be when deliberating her choice (measured using 4 items; all F’s < 2.8 and p’s > .1).
However, the pretest verified that participants perceived the decision maker as more conflicted
when observing the picture in the strong (as opposed to weak) conflict cue condition (measured
using 4 items; all F’s > 8.5 and p’s < .005). In the no-cue condition no picture of facial
expression was presented. Then, participants in all conditions were informed that the actor
decided to attend her best friend’s wedding and they were asked to indicate the likelihood that
they would have chosen similarly (on a 1-7 scale ranging from very unlikely to very likely).
Finally, participants completed 12 items from the Interpersonal Reactivity Index scale (IRI) to
measure their innate tendency to empathize with others (Davis 1983). The items were highly
correlated (αCronbach = .9) and were therefore collapsed to form a single measure (a list of the
items is available in Appendix B).
Participants also completed the need-for-cognition scale (Cacioppo, Petty, and Kao 1984)
to determine whether a different, important, and possibly relevant individual difference could
explain the effect. An ANOVA confirmed that the experimental manipulation didn’t affect any
of the scales employed (IRI: F(2,430) = 1.18, p > .3; NFC: F(2,430) = .91, p > .4). Finally, to
verify that participants’ innate tendency to empathize was not correlated with greater
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attentiveness to the study materials and manipulations, at the end of the study, participants
indicated the name of the decision maker in the scenario and the two events of her focal decision.
Overall, the recall accuracy for both was very high (95.6% and 92.8%, respectively), and
importantly, neither significantly correlated with participants’ IRI scores (p’s > .36).

Results
A one-way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of condition on preference
convergence (F(2,430) = 3.97, p < .02). Planned contrasts revealed participants’ preferences
converged more when they observed the actor’s strong conflict cue (Mstrong-conflict = 5.95)
compared to when observing the weak conflict cue (Mweak-conflict = 5.41, t(289) = 2.78, p < .01),
and also compared to when no cue regarding the decision maker’s choice conflict was provided
(Mno-cue = 5.59, t(287) = 2.01, p < .05).
To examine how individuals’ innate tendency to empathize with others (using the IRI
scale) affected preference convergence, we regressed the dependent variable (likelihood of
choosing similarly) on (i) the different conditions (effect coding), (ii) IRI response (mean
centered), and (iii) their interaction. As predicted, the effect of conflict level on preference
convergence was positive and significant (B = .26, p < .007), supporting our main hypothesis. In
addition, the main effect of participants’ innate tendency to empathize was significance and had
a positive effect (B = .25, p < .02). Importantly, the interaction between the two was significant,
indicating the impact of observed decisional conflict on preference convergence was more
pronounced for participants with a greater tendency to empathize with others (B = .25 p < .05).
Figure 3 depicts preference-convergence rates across conditions and as a function of the
observer’s innate tendency to empathize with others. As can be seen, a cue regarding the actor’s
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emotional conflict triggered convergence that was more pronounced for participants with a
higher innate tendency to empathize with others. However, the innate tendency to empathize did
not moderate convergence in the no-conflict or control conditions.

FIGURE 3. STUDY 2: PREFERENCE CONVERGENCE AS A FUNCTION OF
ACTOR’S CONFLICT AND OBSERVER’S INNATE EMPATHIC CONCERNS (IRI)
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Discussion
This study demonstrates again that participants’ preferences converged to those of an
actor who exhibited greater decisional conflict. Importantly, this study underscores the role of
empathy as the underlying mechanism. Participants with a stronger innate tendency to empathize
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with others converged in preferences more so than those with a weaker tendency when observing
the emotional conflict experienced by the actor. Moreover, observing a conflicted actor triggered
preference convergence also relative to a condition that included no cue about the actor’s
conflict. Thus, underscoring the notion that process cues matter when examining how others
influence our choice.
The results also help rule out inferential process as the main driver. First, we pretested the
materials (see Appendix A) and found they did not affect participants’ perceptions about the
decision maker’s attentiveness or thoughtfulness, thus making such an inference account less
plausible. Second, inferences about attentiveness, to the extent they occurred, should be made
regardless of participants’ innate tendency to empathize with others. Thus, this study emphasizes
the role of empathic reactions and supports the suggested emotional-based mechanism. The next
study tests the entire path of the suggested underlying mechanism and explores the mediating
roles of empathy and shared identity.

STUDY 3 - THE MEDIATING ROLES OF EMPATHY AND SHARED IDENTITY

The goal of Study 3 was to directly test the suggested underlying mechanism, which
involves two mediators that operate sequentially, namely, empathy and a sense of shared
identity. Accordingly, our analysis plan in this study involved a multi-step mediation as depicted
in Figure 1. We hypothesized that observed decisional conflict (the independent variable; X)
triggers empathic reactions (the first mediator; M1), which triggers a greater sense of shared
identity (the second mediator; M2), which ultimately leads to preference convergence (the
dependent variable; Y).
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Method
We recruited 125 paid, online subjects to participate in the study (7 of whom had
incomplete responses and were therefore eliminated from the analyses). In the first part of the
study, participants were asked to write down the name of an acquaintance. The instructions
explained this person did not necessarily have to be a best friend but rather someone with whom
they were in regular contact, and currently unattached romantically. To increase the realism and
involvement we instructed participants to indicate how long they had known this person, and to
write a short paragraph describing how they met. Next, we measured participants’ initial level of
shared identity with the person they selected for the study, using several items administered in
previous research. Specifically, following Goldstein and Cialdini (2007a), we asked participants
to indicate the extent to which they (i) felt a shared identity with their friend, (ii) felt similar to
their friend, and (iii) shared similar attributes with their friend (all on a 1-11 scale ranging from
not at all to extremely). Following Batson et al. (1997) and Cialdini et al. (1997), we also asked
participants (iv) the extent to which they would use the term “we” to describe their relationship
with their friend, and (v) to choose one of the seven overlapping circles taken from the IOS scale
(Aron, Aron, and Smollan 1992) that best describes that relationship. These five items (which
were measured in random order) were highly correlated (αCronbach = .87) and were collapsed to
form the measure of initial shared identity.
After completing an unrelated survey, participants advanced to the main section of the
study and were asked to imagine their friend was facing a decision. In the scenario (available in
Appendix C), their friend was involved in a romantic relationship, and although this relationship
had started only two months previously, it was going well and had the potential to be long term.
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In addition, their friend had been recently offered the job he or she always dreamed of. However,
taking this position would mean having to move to the other side of the country for a period of at
least 12 months and possibly longer. Further, because the friend’s romantic partner could not
make such a move (because of other attachments), their friend was facing a decision to either
accept the offer and move, potentially ending what could become a very serious relationship, or
stay and forgo what could be the career opportunity of a lifetime.
Participants were then assigned to one of two conditions: conflict versus control. In the
conflict condition, participants were also told to imagine that when they met their friend, they
saw he or she was in apparent agony and pain over this decision. The description of the conflict
included sleepless nights and extreme conflict. Participants assigned to the control condition did
not receive any information about the emotional conflict, pain, or agony their friend experienced.
The scenarios were identical in terms of the phrasing and the informational content they provided
to participants, and differed only in the description of the actor’s emotional conflict.
After reading the scenario, participants indicated on a 1-7 scale ranging from not at all to
extremely the extent to which they felt each of the following six emotions toward their friend
when learning about this decision: Sympathy, Softhearted, Warm, Compassionate, Tender, and
Moved (Batson et al. 1997). The items were highly correlated (αCronbach = .94) and were therefore
collapsed to form a single measure of empathy. Next, we again measured participants’ degree of
shared identity with their friend, using the same items administered in the first part of the study.
Again, the five items were highly correlated (αCronbach = .88) and we therefore collapsed them to
form the measure of subsequent shared identity between participants and their chosen friend.
Thus, this measure enabled us to examine whether the degree of shared identity changed after
reading the scenarios. By subtracting the initial level of shared identity from the subsequent
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shared identity, we obtained a change score. A positive score indicates participants felt a greater
shared identity with their friend after reading the scenario. Conversely, a negative score indicates
the degree of shared identity decreased after participants read the scenario.
Finally, participants were told which decision their friend had made (either to stay or
leave; counterbalanced), and were asked to indicate the likelihood they would have done the
same (on a 1-7 scale ranging from very unlikely to very likely).

Results
A two-way ANOVA with conflict cue and friend’s decision as independent variables first
revealed participants generally agreed more with their friend’s decision to make the move and
accept the position, as opposed to staying and declining the position (F(1,114) = 17.64, p <
.001). Further, irrespective of the decision, participants who learned about the conflict their
friend experienced tended to agree more with their friend’s decision (Mconflict = 4.97) compared
to those who were not exposed to information describing the friend’s emotional conflict (Mcontrol
= 4.3; F(1,114) = 4.0, p < .05). The interaction between decision and condition was not
significant (F(1,114) < 1). Therefore, we used the friend’s decision (move vs. stay) as a covariate
in the mediation analysis.
Mediation Analysis. The data were submitted to a multi-step mediation analysis with two
sequential mediators (using the macro PROCESS, model 6, Hayes 2013). As depicted in Figure
4, the dependent variable (Y) was the degree to which participants’ preferences converged to
those of their friend’s. The potential mediators were the degree to which participants empathized
with their friend (M1) and the degree to which participants’ sense of shared identity changed
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(M2). The independent variable (X) was a dummy variable representing the two experimental
conditions (conflict vs. control).

FIGURE 4. STUDY 3: MULTI-STEP MEDIATION MODEL
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The path estimates confirmed the hypothesized multi-step mediation process. First, the
total-effect model confirmed a significant relationship between condition (conflict vs. control)
and the degree to which participants’ preferences converged (path c in Figure 4: B = .63, p <
.05), supporting the main hypothesis. Further, the results confirmed the proposed chain of
mediators, namely, empathic reactions (M1) and shared identity (M2), mediated the effect of
conflict cue on preference convergence. Learning about their friend’s emotional conflict
increased participants’ empathic reactions (path a1 in Figure 4: B = .55, p < .03). Such reactions
had a significant and positive impact on participants’ sense of shared identity with their friends
(path a3 in Figure 4: B = .18, p < .01). We found this increase in shared identity had a significant
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and positive effect on the degree of preference convergence (path b2 in Figure 4: B = .41, p <
.02). No other paths were significant. The 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect was
obtained with 10,000 bootstrap resamples and supported the suggested multi-step mediation (B =
.04, CI95% = .003 to .16). No other indirect effects were significant. To verify the uniqueness of
the proposed path, we performed an additional multi-step mediation analysis in which we
switched the position of the two mediators. Consistent with previous literature, the analysis ruled
out this path and the 95% confidence interval included zero (Breversed = .02, CI95% = -.02 to .1).
Table 1 details the full results of the multi-step mediation analysis.
TABLE 1. STUDY 3: MULTI-STEP MEDIATION RESULTS
Model-Path Estimates
Coefficient

SE

t

p

a1

.55

.23

2.33

< .03

a2

.31

.19

1.6

> .11

a3

.18

.07

2.4

< .02

b1

.19

.12

1.5

> .12

b2

.41

.15

2.7

< .01

c

.63

.31

1.99

< .05

c'

.35

.31

1.13

> .26

Indirect Effect (with Bootstrap 95% Confidence Interval and Standard Errors)
Effect

LL 95% CI

UL 95% CI

SE

XM1Y
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.10
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.13

-.02
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.09

XM1M2Y

.04

.01

.16

.03

XM2M1Y

.02

-.02
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Discussion
The results of this study provide additional and direct support for the proposed
underlying psychological mechanism. We found that participants tended to choose more
similarly to an actor after learning about this actor’s emotional conflict during his or her
deliberation phase. Empathic reactions toward the conflicted actor and a greater sense of shared
identity, operating sequentially, mediated such convergence of preferences. Thus, the findings
show that regardless of other potential drivers of the effect, empathy and shared identity also
play important and significant roles. Additionally, in an auxiliary analysis (reported on Appendix
D) we did not find that the degree of initial level of shared identity between the observer and the
actor moderated the effect. That is, controlling for the degree of initial shared identity, a cue
regarding an actor’s emotional conflict triggered preference convergence compared to when such
a cue was not available.
The studies thus far have tested the roles of empathy (Studies 2 and 3) and of shared
identity (Study 3). The pretest for Study 2 helped rule out inferential processes regarding the
actor’s attentiveness or thoughtfulness as the main driver. Further, the significant mediation in
Study 3 supports the underlying psychological mechanism above and beyond any inferential
processes (to the extent these occurred). Nevertheless, we designed Studies 4a and 4b to directly
rule out inferential processes by demonstrating the effect persists also in situations that render
such inferences completely irrelevant (i.e., scenarios that involve random outcomes).

	
  

31	
  
STUDY 4a – FOCUS ON THE ACTOR’S EMOTIONAL CONFLICT

In Study 4a, participants learned about an individual facing an important decision. As
part of a lottery game, this individual had to decide between two boxes: one containing a huge
monetary prize and the other containing nothing. We assumed participants would consider such a
decision as involving conflict and emotional stress. Then, instead of giving participants an
external cue about the actor’s conflict (as in Studies 1, 2, and 3), in the current study, we asked
them to reflect on and write down the feelings, emotions, and accompanying body language that
they believed the actor was experiencing when making the decision. We vetted this condition
against two control conditions in which participants were either instructed to write a nonemotional paragraph about the decision maker or not instructed to write at all. We hypothesized
that the emotional-reflection manipulation would increase participants’ focus on the conflict the
decision maker experienced and would therefore increase the likelihood of convergence.
In this study, to further isolate the proposed mechanism, we decided to use a choice that
was inherently random. Choosing the box with the prize is purely guesswork; thus, inferences
with respect to the thoughtfulness of the decision maker or the formation of a diligent decision
process are irrelevant. By so doing, we essentially eliminate any potential informational value
that conflict can have in this scenario, and only test its emotional impact on preference
convergence. In addition, whereas one could argue that external cues for the actor’s conflict may
trigger inferential processes, such an account is less plausible when observers themselves
generate the perception of conflict (by reflecting on the actor’s emotional state).
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Method
Ninety paid graduate and undergraduate students from a large East Coast university
participated in the study (3 of whom had incomplete responses and were therefore eliminated
from the analyses). Participants read a scenario in which a person (“Mike”) was randomly
chosen from the audience of a TV game show for the chance to play a simple lottery game.
Participants learned this individual was given a choice between two boxes: one containing
$200,000 and the other containing nothing. Participants were told that if Mike chooses the box
containing the cash prize, he gets to keep the money.
We then assigned participants to one of three conditions. In the emotionally rich
condition participants were instructed to reflect on the decision that Mike was about to make, and
to write a paragraph describing his feelings, emotions, and body language during his
deliberations. We expected that given the decision context, participants in this condition would
focus on the conflict and emotional stress that Mike might exhibit during his deliberations. In the
second condition, participants were not asked to reflect on or write anything about the decision
maker (hereafter, the control condition). Finally, as an additional control, we asked participants
assigned to a third condition to write a paragraph describing their thoughts about how Mike
might use the money if he won (hereafter, the emotion-free condition). Participants in both the
emotionally rich and emotion-free conditions were instructed to be as detailed as possible, and
were only allowed to continue the survey after at least two minutes had elapsed (we found no
difference in writing time across conditions, p > .59).
Next, participants in all conditions were shown a picture of the two boxes (labeled Box A
and Box B) and were told that Mike eventually chose Box B. Then, participants used a 1-6 scale
ranging from definitely choose Box A to definitely choose Box B to indicate their likelihood of
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choosing one box over the other. The scale did not have a midpoint, thus forcing participants to
indicate preference for one box over the other. We omitted a midpoint because in such a context
involving a completely random choice, we believe participants would indicate indifference
between the two boxes (as this is the rational and expected thing to do). However, once
participants were required to choose one over the other, we expected to see convergence due to
an increased focus on the actor’s emotional conflict.

Results
A one-way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of condition on preference
convergence (F(2,84) = 3.69, p < .03). As expected, the preferences of participants who were
instructed to reflect on and write about the emotions, feelings, and body language of the decision
maker converged more (Memotionally-rich = 4.4) than those of participants who were either instructed
to write an emotion-free paragraph (Memotion-free = 3.46; t(56) = 2.43, p < .02) or not instructed to
write at all (Mcontrol = 3.59; t(57) = 2.38, p = .02). Figure 5 depicts the convergence rates across
the three conditions.
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FIGURE 5. STUDY 4a: PREFERENCE CONVERGENCE ACROSS EXPERIMENTAL
CONDITIONS
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Content Analysis. Two independent coders who were blind to the hypothesis analyzed the
participants’ paragraphs. The coders indicated the extent to which each paragraph described
Mike as being conflicted (on a 1-5 scale ranging from not at all to extremely), and how difficult
and painful the decision was for him (using the same scale). The correlations between the coders
on both measures were significant and high (rconflict = .82, p < .001 and rdifficulty = .8, p < .001);
therefore, we collapsed their responses. In addition, the correlation between the two items was
also high (r = .94, p < .001); therefore, we collapsed the two items to form a single measure of
participants’ focus on the decision maker’s conflict level.
As expected, participants who were asked to write about the emotions and feelings of the
decision maker focused on his conflict more (Memotionally-rich = 4.13) compared to participants who
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were asked to write about how the decision maker might use his winnings (Memotion-free = 1.71,
F(1,56) = 110.23, p < .001). Below are representative examples of the responses in each of the
writing conditions.
Emotionally Rich Condition:
Mike is definitely nervous and anxious. He is nervous about choosing the right box, and
anxious about the consequences or rewards of choosing a box. He probably is sweating a
little bit and shifting back and forth, maybe has his arms crossed with a nervous look on
his face. He could be biting his nails as well. He is definitely moving around a lot. If he is
sitting down he is shifting in his seat.
Emotion-free Condition:
Mike will use the money to get out of debt, as well as buy personal items. Hopefully, he
will also invest a percentage of the money so that he will always have savings. He will
probably buy a car. If he is in student loan debt, he will probably pay all or a bulk of it
off. Mike may also use the money to put down a down payment on a house. He will
probably go to a nice restaurant and celebrate his big win with family. If he has a
girlfriend, he will probably buy a gift or gifts for her as well. Lastly, he may donate a
portion of the money to a friend in need and/or catch up on other bills (rent, utilities,
etc.).

Mediation Analysis. A mediation analysis (using the macro PROCESS, model 4, Hayes
2013) confirmed that when examining the two writing conditions together, the extent to which
participants focused on the decision maker’s emotional conflict mediated the effect of condition
on preference convergence (B = 1.21; CI95% = .31 to 2.88). However, a more stringent test for
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our hypothesis would be to examine whether within the emotionally rich condition, the extent to
which participants focused on the decision maker’s conflict (which was high throughout) was
correlated with the tendency to converge in preference. In fact, a regression analysis (using
responses only from the emotionally rich condition) confirmed that the degree to which
participants’ focused on the decision maker’s conflict was a positive and significant predictor of
preference convergence (B = .5, p < .02).

Discussion
This study suggests that even in instances in which no objective criteria exist for making
the “right” choice, observing a conflicted actor nevertheless leads to preference convergence.
Further, we found this effect was more pronounced in individuals who focused more on the
emotional conflict the actor experienced. In addition, consistent with research on empathy, this
study highlights that convergence may occur even in the absence of direct observations of a
conflicted actor. Memory, knowledge, reflection, and reasoning can still produce insights into the
emotional states of others and trigger preference convergence.
The next study employs a similar decision context and explores an important boundary
condition for the effect. We show that convergence occurs only when observers empathize with
the actor. In instances where observers do not empathize with the conflicted actor (e.g., because
they consider the conflict exhibited by the actor as unreasonable and unwarranted for the
decision at hand), convergence attenuates.
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STUDY 4b – APPROPRIATE CONFLICT AND ITS MODERATING ROLE

So far, the studies have consistently shown that observing an emotionally conflicted actor
prompts preference convergence; however, it may not always. In particular, because we
hypothesize that convergence occurs as a result of empathic reactions and a greater sense of
shared identity, the effect should attenuate when the observed conflict does not trigger such
reactions. For example, observing an actor experiencing an emotional conflict over a decision
that observers consider trivial might impede taking this actor’s perspective and feeling a sense of
shared identity. Hence, we predict that a cue about the emotional conflict an actor experiences
should trigger preference convergence only if the observer considers such conflict and agony as
warranted and reasonable for the decision at hand.

Method
After completing an unrelated study, 200 paid, online subjects participated in the study (9
of whom had incomplete responses and were therefore eliminated from the analyses).
Participants read the same scenario as described in Study 4a about an individual facing a lottery
choice between two boxes. Unlike Study 4a, in which participants did not receive a direct signal
concerning the actor’s conflict, in this study, we randomly assigned participants to two conflict
conditions (high vs. low) and asked them to imagine they had observed this individual
deliberating his choice. We told the high-conflict participants that the actor was in apparent
agony and pain over this decision and was extremely conflicted and nervous about which box to
choose. We told the low-conflict participants that the actor did not appear to be in any agony or
pain over this decision.
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To test the aforementioned boundary condition, we also manipulated (between subjects)

the potential cash rewards from the lottery. In particular, in the first condition, we told
participants that one of the boxes contained $200,000 and the other contained nothing (i.e., an
identical scenario to that employed in Study 4a). However, in the second condition, we told
participants that one box contained $200,000 and the other box contained $150,000. Thus, in this
condition, regardless of which box the actor eventually chose, he would win at least $150,000 in
cash. We predicted that in this decision, with a sure gain of $150,000, observers would deem a
high emotional conflict exhibited by the actor as unwarranted.
Using a pretest (reported in Appendix E), we verified that when an actor faced a choice
between boxes containing $200,000 or nothing (hereafter, the high-stakes condition), participants
considered high conflict as justified and reasonable. However, choosing between boxes that both
provided high monetary prizes of either $200,000 or $150,000 (hereafter, the low-stakes
condition), participants did not see choice conflict as appropriate. Therefore, empathy and
convergence should occur when observing a conflicted actor in the high- but not in the lowstakes condition.
After reading the scenario and learning the conflict level in this 2 (actor’s conflict: high
vs. low) x 2 (stakes: high vs. low) between-subjects design, participants were told the actor had
chosen box B. We then presented the participants with the two boxes again and told them that
“although this is obviously a completely random decision, which box do you believe you would
choose if you were asked to make a similar decision?” Participants then indicated their likelihood
of choosing one box over the other on a 1-6 scale ranging from definitely choose Box A to
definitely choose Box B.

	
  

39	
  

Results
Preference Convergence. Using a 2 (conflict: high vs. low) X 2 (stakes: high vs. low)
ANOVA, we analyzed the degree to which participants’ preferences converged to those of the
actor’s. The analysis revealed the expected interaction between observed conflict and decision
stakes (F(1,187) = 5.54, p = .02). In particular, when participants observed an actor facing a
high-stakes decision (i.e., boxes containing $200,000 or nothing), their preferences converged in
the high conflict condition but not in the low-conflict condition (Mhigh conflict = 4.16, Mlow conflict =
3.4, t(1,93) = 2.46, p < .016). However, a cue regarding the actor’s high conflict did not trigger
preference convergence in the low-stakes condition (i.e., boxes containing $200,000 or
$150,000), that is, when participants did not perceive the conflict as appropriate to the decision at
hand (Mhigh conflict = 3.3, Mlow conflict = 3.58, t(1,94) = .88, p > .38). We observed no main effects of
conflict level or stakes (p > .27, and p > .12, respectively). Figure 6 displays the degree (and
distribution) of preference convergence as a function of conflict and stakes in the decision.

FIGURE 6. STUDY 4b: PREFERENCE CONVERGENCE AS A FUNCTION OF ACTOR’S
CONFLICT AND STAKES IN THE DECISION

* Numbers in parentheses indicate the proportion of responses that converged to
the actor’s choice (i.e., indicated greater likelihood of choosing like the actor)
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Discussion
As in Study 4a, the results of this study suggest that even when the outcome is inherently
random, observing an actor’s decisional conflict triggers preference convergence. The study also
shows that the effect is moderated by whether or not the observer perceives the actor’s conflict as
appropriate and reasonable for the decision at hand. This study underscores three important
issues that are consistent with the suggested emotional account. First, if the cue about the actor’s
emotional conflict (even in cases with random outcomes) had certain informational value with
respect to the accuracy of the decision, observers would have converged in both the high- and
low-stakes conditions. That is, observers would have used such a cue to maximize their
probability of receiving the high prize in both conditions. Thus, this study further implies that
inferential processes, and the notion of conflict as a cue for accuracy, cannot account for the
observed pattern of results.
Second, if the effect was driven by participants’ perceptions that the actor behaved as
they would have behaved in a similar situation, one would expect to see convergence in both
matching conditions (i.e., high conflict in a high-stakes decision and low conflict in low-stakes
decision; upper-left and lower-right cells in Figure 6). As the pretest indicated (available in
Appendix E), in both of these conditions, participants perceived the conflict level exhibited by
the actor to be appropriate and to match how they themselves would have likely reacted.
However, we find that participants’ preferences converged only in the high-conflict high-stakes
condition. An actor’s behavior that was consistent with the observer’s expectations but did not
include an emotional conflict did not produce convergence.
Third, based on the proposed framework, one could speculate about two main reasons for
why observing an actor conflicted over a trivial decision did not produce convergence (i.e., in the
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high-conflict low-stakes condition; lower-left cell in Figure 6). The first is that participants might
not have empathized with the conflicted actor. Such lack of empathy may have occurred because
observers may have questioned the authenticity of the actor’s conflict, or viewed his behavior as
an unwarranted complication (e.g., Schrift, Netzer, and Kivetz 2011). A second explanation
would suggest that although observers did empathize with the conflicted actor, they had
difficulty feeling a sense of shared identity with an actor that behaved in a very different manner
than how they themselves would have behaved. Although both accounts are consistent with our
framework, a posttest (available in Appendix F) supported the former explanation. That is, the
post-test indicated that in this specific context, participants did not empathize with the actor that
was conflicted over choosing between two extremely positive outcomes.
In the next and final study, we explore how observed conflict affect decisions in a group
decision-making context. In such a setting, observed conflict may play an important and
pertinent role in shaping group members’ preferences, because members are often exposed to
other members’ decision processes and conflict in choice.

STUDY 5 - OBSERVED CONFLICT AND CONVERGENCE IN GROUP CONTEXT

The goal of this study was to examine, in an incentive-compatible manner, how the effect
of observed emotional conflict on preference convergence may affect voting behavior in a group
decision-making context. Note that in this study, we did not test group decision-making
dynamics per se but rather explored how an individual’s preferences might be influenced in such
a setting. We told participants that they were playing a group version of the ultimatum game, and
exposed them to comments and thoughts one of their group members ostensibly had during the
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deliberations. We manipulated whether the description of these comments included a cue for
experienced emotional conflict, and examined whether, and to what extent, participants’
preferences converged to those of their conflicted or non-conflicted teammate.

Method
We offered 105 paid participants from a national online panel to complete a bonus survey
for additional compensation after completing an unrelated survey (14 participants declined to
participate in the additional task, leaving us with a sample size of 91 subjects). We informed
participants that the computer would randomly assign them to one of two groups (distinguished
by color, either yellow or blue), each containing three members. We then told participants they
would play a simple game, and gave them the instructions for the ultimatum game. Specifically,
we informed participants that the yellow team would receive a total of $3.00 and would decide
by voting how much of the $3.00 to allocate to the blue team. After receiving the offer, the blue
team would then vote on whether to accept the offer. If the blue team decided to accept the offer,
the money would be allocated accordingly. However, if the blue team decided to reject the offer,
neither of the groups would receive money and both would leave without any additional
compensation. After receiving these instructions, participants also received a short numerical
example of a fictitious game to ensure they understood the rules. We also informed participants
that this game would be played once, was completely anonymous, and that they will be
compensated in accordance with their decision in this game.
The next page informed all participants that they had been randomly assigned to the blue
team (i.e., the team that needed to decide whether to accept or reject the offer). Participants then
learned that out of the total $3.00, the yellow team ostensibly decided to keep $2.70 and offered
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the blue team the remaining $0.30. Participants were also informed that one of their teammates
had already voted and indicated his or her comments about this decision. Participants then read
the text supposedly entered by their teammate and learned about his or her vote.
The text either included a cue regarding the emotional conflict (high-conflict condition)
or did not include such a cue (control condition). Specifically, participants in both conditions
read the following text: “I think that the offer they gave us is really inappropriate! We got almost
nothing...much less than half…c’mon!!! Still it is something, right?” Participants is the highconflict condition also read the following: “I don’t know what to do :/ Oh…why is this such a
difficult and conflicting decision for me? grrr…” Finally, participants in both conditions read
their teammate’s decision, which was either to accept or reject the offer (manipulated between
subjects): “I think that I will vote for [accepting/rejecting] the offer…” Participants in both
conditions then indicated their vote of whether to accept or reject the offer. To increase the
realism of the study, participants were also allowed to write anything they would like their third
teammate to read before casting his or her vote.
After casting their votes, participants were told they would learn about the outcome of the
game in the next few days once all games had been played. Finally, as a manipulation check, we
asked participants to indicate how conflicted they perceived their teammate to be (on a 1-7 scale
ranging from not at all to extremely). To verify that the emotional conflict cue did not trigger
inferences about the teammate’s decision quality, participants also indicated the extent to which
they (i) perceived their team member to be thoughtful when making the decision (on a 1-7 scale
ranging from not at all to extremely), (ii) perceived their teammate to be careless when making
the decision (on a 1-7 scale ranging from not at all to extremely), and (iii) were conflicted about
this decision (on a 1-7 scale ranging from not at all to extremely).
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Results
Manipulation Check. A MANOVA confirmed the manipulation worked as intended.

Participants assigned to the conflict condition reported perceiving their teammate as more
conflicted compared to those assigned to the control (Mconflict = 4.78, Mcontrol = 3.58; F(1,89) =
9.87, p < .002). However, we found no significant differences across conditions with respect to
how thoughtful or careless they perceived their teammate to be (p > .25 and p > .93,
respectively). In addition, we found no significant difference in participants’ self-reports of their
own experienced conflict when making their decision (p > .45).
Convergence of Preferences. To examine whether and to what extent participants’ votes
converged to that of their teammate, we performed a binary logistic regression with participants’
vote as the dependent variable (coding 1 as vote consistent with their teammate’s, and 0
otherwise). The independent variables in the model were (i) experimental condition (conflict vs.
control), (ii) teammate’s vote (accept vs. reject), and (iii) their interaction. As expected,
participants who received a cue regarding their teamate’s emotional conflict tended to vote
similarly to a greater extent (Mconflict = 75.5%) than those who did not receive such a cue (Mcontrol
= 56.5%; B = 1.39, p < .05). We found no main effect for the second manipulated factor (i.e.,
teammate’s decision; p > .73) or its interaction with conflict cue (p > .28), indicating
convergence occurred regardless of the actor’s ultimate decision.

Discussion
The results of this study further demonstrate the impact of a conflict cue in a real and
consequential choice situation, but this time in a group decision-making context. Observing
another teammate’s conflict during deliberation significantly affected participants’ preferences
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and influenced whether they accepted or rejected a real financial offer in the ultimatum game. In
addition to providing supportive evidence for the importance and applicability of the proposed
effect, this study underscores the notion that the process by which an actor reaches his or her
final decision matters and shapes the observer’s preferences.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

Decision making often entails conflict. Whether we observe these decisions in real time
or learn about them post-hoc, we are often exposed to (or learn about) the extent to which the
decision maker experienced choice conflict. This article investigates whether and why learning
about other people’s decisional conflicts affects our preferences. We find that observing another
person’s decisional conflict increases the likelihood that the observer’s preferences will converge
to those of the actor. Watching others in “pain and agony” over an impending decision triggers
empathic reactions that make the observer feel psychologically closer to the conflicted actor.
This greater sense of shared identity leads the observer’s preferences to converge to those of the
actor. That is, when facing a similar decision, the observer is more likely to choose the option the
conflicted actor chose. More broadly, we find that observers’ preferences are not only influenced
by an actor’s ultimate choice, but also by the process leading to this choice. In other words,
process matters.
Review of Key Findings. Six studies consistently demonstrated the proposed effect. Study
1 explored the effect in a realistic setting in which individuals observed paid confederates who
were either conflicted or not about an impending consequential decision. Study 2 showed that
this effect is more pronounced for individuals with a greater innate tendency to empathize with
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others. In Study 3, a multi-step mediation analysis confirmed the role of the two mediators that
work sequentially, namely, empathy and shared identity. Studies 4a and 4b showed this effect
occurs even in decision contexts with random outcomes, thus underscoring the emotional (as
opposed to rational) driver of this effect. Further, Study 4a demonstrated that reflection about the
decision maker’s emotional state triggers preference convergence, but that such convergence is
attenuated if the observer perceives the emotional conflict as unwarranted (Study 4b). Study 5
explored this effect in a group decision-making context and found that in a group version of the
ultimatum game, players’ votes tended to converge to those of their emotionally conflicted
teammates. Across the different studies, we manipulated observed conflict in various manners
and measured convergence in several ways, such as real allocation of money, reported likelihood
of choosing similarly, and consequential voting behavior. In Appendix G we report an additional
study (Study 6) in which we measured convergence using self-reported attribute weights. Thus,
this study demonstrates the effect using a very different paradigm, and also allows us to test an
additional rival account (i.e., perceived polarization of preferences).
Alternative Explanation. A rival account for the observed effect would reason that greater
decisional conflict may be associated with perceptions of greater attentiveness and
thoughtfulness, and therefore with better (i.e., more accurate and informed) decisions. We agree
that such inferential processes may exist in some situations. However, we argue that the
proposed emotion-based mechanism is separate and distinct. Aside from employing tests that
ensured the conflict cues did not trigger perceptions of thoughtfulness (Studies 2 and 5), we
showed the effect occurs even in decisions that involved random outcomes (Studies 4a and 4b).
In such decisions, inferences about the accuracy of the actor’s choice are immaterial. Moreover,
because the decision contexts that were examined across the studies are governed by subjective
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preferences, there are no clear and objective criteria regarding what constitutes a “better” or
more accurate decision. Therefore, in these contexts such rival account is less plausible.
Additionally, inferences about the quality of the decision should be made regardless of
the observer’s innate tendency to empathize with others, and should not produce empathic
reactions and sense of shared identity. However, inconsistent with this rival account, we found
the effect was mediated by sense of empathy and shared identity (Study 3) and moderated by the
individual’s innate tendency to empathize with others (Study 2).
An additional and related rival account may advance the notion that observers converge
to the preferences of actors that behave in a manner consistent with how they themselves would
have behaved. However, the results of Study 4b demonstrated that compatibility between the
actor’s behavior and what the observer feels is an appropriate behavior is not a sufficient
condition for convergence. An “appropriate” degree of decisional conflict did not produce
convergence when the actor exhibited low conflict. Instead, convergence occurred only when the
actor exhibited high emotional conflict, and when this conflict was deemed appropriate. The fact
that both aspects (i.e., high conflict and compatibility) should occur concurrently to produce
convergence is consistent with our conceptual framework and with the results of the posttest
reported in Appendix F.
It is noteworthy that we do not claim the suggested emotion-based account is the only
mechanism that may be at play. We acknowledge that although in some situations, an empathic
response to others’ emotional conflict may be an important driver of preferences, in other
situations, it may be overpowered by other important underlying motivations to assimilate or
distance oneself from a specific actor (e.g., Asch 1956; Berger and Heath 2008; Escalas and
Bettman 2003; Ferraro, Bettman, and Chartrand 2009; Goldstein and Cialdini 2007b; McFerran
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et al. 2010; Shalev and Morwitz 2012; White and Dahl 2006). However, as a whole, the results
indicate that, controlling for other potential drivers of the effect, the suggested emotional
mechanism is important and distinct.
Contribution and Future Directions. From a theoretical perspective, this paper explores
an understudied aspect of social influence: holding constant the actor’s characteristics and
ultimate choice, the process leading to the actor’s choice is also an important driver that shapes
observers’ preferences. Although this paper focused on a central and often conspicuous aspect of
the decision process, namely, conflict, other aspects could merit further investigation. Another
potentially fruitful direction for future research would be to explore how would others’ decision
processes influence the observer’s decision process itself (and not only outcome).
The current paper also extends the literature regarding empathy and self-other merging to
decision contexts. Conspicuous conflict, pain, and agony that a decision maker experiences
trigger empathy that fosters “closeness.” Relatedly, as reported in Study 4b, we found that
perceptions of the appropriate degree of conflict moderated observers’ tendency to empathize
with the actor. This finding is consistent with recent research demonstrating that decision makers
value compatibility between the effort they anticipate or think a certain decision merits and the
actual effort that is exerted (i.e., the effort compatibility hypothesis; Schrift et al. 2011). The
current results suggest that such a desire for compatibility may be present even when observing
others making a decision.
Future research may examine, more broadly, how different sources and attributions for
other’s experienced conflict may impact the observer’s judgment and behavior. For example,
whether or not the conflict experienced by others is perceived warranted, sincere, driven by
context versus one’s innate dispositions to be conflicted, may lead to different results. Such

	
  

49	
  

attributions may also be influenced by factors such as the ability to defer judgment (e.g., Dhar
1997; Parker and Schrift 2011), time constraints (e.g., Dhar and Nowlis 1999; Suri and Monroe
2003), and social pressure (e.g., Asch 1956).
From an applied perspective, this research also suggests that through exhibiting and/or
communicating others’ decisional conflicts, one may increase convergence and consensus
tendencies. This strategy may prove to be valuable in several domains, such as when leaders,
managers, and individuals seek to build a consensus around a difficult decision they or others
have made. Other situations may include persuasion messages that promote a choice of a specific
product or service, as well as other situations in which one wishes to directly foster closeness
between a character and an audience (e.g., greater identification with a spokesperson or even
with a character in a movie or a book). Pain and decisional conflict matter and bring us closer.
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APPENDIX A. PRETEST OF PICTURES USED IN STUDY 2

We performed a pretest to verify that the pictures employed in Study 2 elicited
perceptions of greater conflict but not perceptions of greater attentiveness or thoughtfulness with
respect to the impending decision

Method
Fifty-five online subjects read a short scenario about a dilemma a woman faced: which of
two important events to attend (her best friend’s wedding or her sister’s bachelorette party). The
scenario explained that a scheduling conflict prevented her from being able to attend both events.
We randomly assigned participants to one of two conditions (A and B). In each condition,
participants observed a single picture of the same woman exhibiting different facial expressions,
ostensibly taken while she was deliberating her decision (see Appendix Figure 1). Participants
were asked to indicate, based on the facial expression, the extent to which this individual
appeared to present any one of the 10 items described in the table below (all on a 1-10 scale
ranging from not at all to very much).
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APPENDIX FIGURE 1. PICTURES PRETESTED FOR STUDY 2

	
  
Picture “A”

	
  

Picture “B”

	
  

Results
A MANOVA indicated that across the two conditions, the four items relating to
decisional conflict were significantly different. Specifically, participants perceived the facial
expression depicted in the picture of condition A (hereafter, the strong conflict cue) to portray a
greater decisional conflict than that depicted in the pictures used in condition B (hereafter, the
weak conflict cue; all F’s > 8.5 and p’s < .005). However, and as intended, we observed no
significant differences on the attentiveness (all F’s < 2.8 and p’s > .1) or mood items (all F’s < 1
and p’s > .6). Note that directionally, three of the four attentiveness items were in the opposite
direction to what we would expect for supporting inferences about the decision quality as the
main driver. Table 1 details the means and statistics for each of the items.
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TABLE 1. PRETEST: SUMMARY OF RESULTS
Condition A

Condition B

(Strong Conflict Cue)

(Weak Conflict Cue)

Mean [S.E.]

Mean [S.E.]

Conflicted

8.75 (.35)

Conflict-related

Concerned

Items

Item

F(1,53)

p-value

7.26 (.36)

8.68

0.005

7.96 (.39)

6.29 (.39)

8.95

0.004

In Difficulty

8.5 (.35)

6.82 (.36)

11.30

0.001

Struggling

9.03 (.36)

6.93 (3.6)

17.00

< 0.001

Attentive

5.64 (.43)

6.11 (.44)

0.58

0.451

Attention-related

Indifferent

2.50 (4.3)

3.52 (.44)

2.68

0.107

Items

Thoughtful

5.71 (.45)

6.78 (.45)

2.74

0.104

Careless

2.64 (.34)

2.37 (.35)

0.31

0.578

Mood-related

Happy

2.57 (.28)

2.74 (.29)

0.17

0.68

Items

Sad

5.36 (.38)

5.3 (.38)

0.01

0.91
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APPENDIX B. STUDY 2: ITEMS USED FROM THE IRI SCALE (Davis 1983)

Participants indicated how well each of the statements described them (on a 1-5 scale
ranging from does not describe me well to describes me very well).

Empathic-concern subscale:
- I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me.
- Sometimes I don't feel very sorry for other people when they are having problems. (-)
- When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective towards them.
- Other people's misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal. (-)
- When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don't feel very much pity for them. (-)
- I am often quite touched by things that I see happen.
- I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person.

Perspective-taking subscale:
- I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other guy's" point of view. (-)
- I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision.
- I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from their
perspective.
- When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in his shoes" for a while.
- Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their place.
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APPENDIX C. SCENARIO USED IN STUDY 3

* Please note the scenario below uses the name “Dan” simply as an example. The real study
contained the actual name of the friend, as indicated by each participant prior to seeing the
scenario.

Your friend, Dan, is faced with a certain dilemma. Specifically, Dan started a relationship
with someone and things are going great. Although they have not been dating for more than 2
months, Dan feels that there is a true long-term potential there and that the feeling is mutual.
In addition, Dan has recently been offered the job he/she always dreamed off; one of these
sought-after positions that could really get one’s career going. However, this position means
that Dan will have to move to the other side of the country for at least 12 months (and possibly
longer).

Conflict condition:
Dan, knowing that the person he/she is dating cannot make this move (due to family and career
attachments), is torn over this decision.
When you meet Dan, you see that he/she is in apparent agony and pain over this decision. On
one hand, the emotions in the relationship are already there and quite intense; on the other hand
they have only been dating for two months and who knows what could happen. In addition, the
position Dan was offered is very rare and this may be an opportunity of a lifetime.
Dan is extremely conflicted for several days and sleepless nights and is
tremendously agonizing over this decision.
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Control condition:
Dan knows that the person he/she is dating cannot make this move (due to school and career
attachments).
You meet with Dan during the time of his deliberations. On one hand, the emotions in
the relationship are already there and quite intense; on the other hand they have only been
dating for two months and who knows what could happen. In addition, the position Dan was
offered is very rare and this may be an opportunity of a lifetime.

APPENDIX D. STUDY 3: AUXILIARY ANALYSES

In the mediation analysis reported in Study 3, we used the change in shared identity
(before versus after observers learned about the actor’s conflict) as our second mediator. Using
this change in shared identity (at the individual level) reduces noise and increases the statistical
power. However, one can also focus on just the initial level of shared identity (measured before
the conflict manipulation) to examine two main interesting aspects. First, we can reasonably
expect that regardless of the actor’s level of exhibited conflict, the observer will tend to
empathize more with a close friend versus a distant friend. If so, we should find a main effect of
initial level of shared identity on empathy and preference convergence.
Second, one could also explore whether the initial level of shared identity moderates the
effect of observed conflict. That is, one could test whether providing a cue about an actor’s
emotional conflict would affect the observer’s empathic reactions and preferences to a different
extent as a function of initial level of shared identity. If so, one would expect to observe an
interaction between initial level of shared identity and conflict cue.
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To explore these conjectures, we first regressed participants’ empathic reaction on (i) the

degree of initial level of shared identity (measured in the first stage of the experiment and prior
to administering the conflict manipulation), (ii) the two experimental conditions (conflict vs.
control), and (iii) their interaction. The results indicated the degree of initial connectedness had a
significant and positive main effect on the degree of empathy the observer experienced (B = .39,
SE = .09, p < .001). That is, regardless of conflict cue, learning about a difficult decision that a
close friend is making triggers greater empathy compared to learning about a distant other
making such a decision.
As expected, the regression also revealed a main effect of conflict level (B = .36, SE =
.16, p < .03) consistent with the main hypothesis of this paper. However, the interaction between
conflict level and initial connectedness was not significant (B = .06, SE = .09, p > .49). Thus, the
results indicate that a cue regarding the emotional conflict the actor experiences significantly
increases the empathy the observer experiences but that this effect occurs regardless of the initial
observer-actor connectedness.
We conducted a similar regression using preference convergence as the dependent
variable. Again, the regression revealed a significant effect of conflict cue (B = .35, SE = .17, p =
.04) and a marginally significant effect of initial connectedness on preference convergence (B =
.17, SE = .09, p > .08). However, the interaction between the two was not significant (B = .05,
SE = .09, p > .62).
In summary, we did not find that the degree of initial level of shared identity between the
observer and the actor moderated the effect of conflict cue on preference convergence. That is,
controlling for the degree of initial shared identity, a cue regarding an actor’s emotional conflict
triggered preference convergence compared to when such a cue was not available. Note that the
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lack of interaction between conflict cue and initial level of shared identity is consistent with our
conceptual framework as well as with existing literature regarding empathy. As noted in the
paper, empathic reactions are primal and involve a visceral component. Thus, empathic reactions
toward others that experience negative emotional states are expected, regardless of how close
people consider the others to be. Indeed, abundant literature on charitable donations
demonstrates that empathic reactions can be triggered even toward others who are distant from
the observer (e.g., in distant countries and from different cultures and backgrounds). Further,
previous research has found that whereas the degree of similarity between individuals affects the
rate of social interaction, such similarity does not fully account for the degree and accuracy of
empathic response (Stinton and Ickes 1992). Similarly, studies have found that children exhibit
empathy even toward individuals they have never met before (e.g., Strayer and Roberts1997).
Thus, the literature seems to support the assertion that a cue regarding others’ emotional conflict
would trigger empathic response regardless of the level of initial shared identity or
connectedness.

APPENDIX E. STUDY 4b: PRETEST

In this pretest for Study 4b, we measured how participants would perceive the behavior
of an actor when facing either the high-stakes or low-stakes decision. In particular, we examined
whether participants perceived the actor’s decisional conflict (high vs. low) appropriate in each
of these decisions. We also examined whether this behavior matched how participants indicated
that they themselves would have behaved in a similar situation. We hypothesized that
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participants would perceive an emotional conflict exhibited by the actor to be warranted (and
match their own behavior) in the high-stakes, but not in the low-stakes, condition.

Method
After completing an unrelated survey, 145 paid, online participants participated in the
pretest. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions described in Study 4b
in this 2 (conflict: high vs. low) x 2 (stakes: high vs. low) design, and they read the same
scenarios used in the main study. However, after learning about the actor’s conflict, participants
indicated (i) the extent to which they considered the actor’s experienced level of conflict to be
appropriate to the situation at hand (on a 1-7 scale ranging from very inappropriate to very
appropriate) and (ii) the extent to which they felt the actor’s reaction in this situation was similar
to how they would have reacted (on a 1-5 scale ranging from not at all like me to just like me).
These two items were highly correlated (r = .75; p < .001), and we collapsed them to form the
appropriateness measure. Finally, participants indicated whether they considered the level of
conflict the actor exhibited in this situation to be too little, too much, or just about right (which
was anchored at the midpoint of the scale).

Results
A two-way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of stakes in the decision (high vs.
low) on the appropriateness measure (F(1,141) = 4.42, p = .037). More importantly, the
interaction between stakes and conflict was significant (F(1,141) = 29.3, p < .001). Planned
contrasts revealed that when facing the high-stakes decision (prize of $200,000 or nothing), the
actor’s high conflict was perceived as more appropriate compared to that described in the low-
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conflict condition (Mhigh conflict = 4.28; Mlow conflict = 3.64; F(1,71) = 4.65, p = .035). Conversely,
when facing the low-stakes decision (prize of $200,000 or $150,000), the actor’s high conflict
was perceived as less appropriate compared to the low conflict (Mhigh conflict = 3.12; Mlow conflict =
4.59; F(1,70) = 34.6, p < .001). Figure 2 depicts the means of the appropriateness score across all
cells.
	
  
	
  
APPENDIX FIGURE 2. PRETEST FOR STUDY 4b: APPROPRIATENESS MEASURE AS A
FUNCTION OF ACTOR’S CONFLICT AND STAKES IN THE DECISION
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Further validating that the manipulation worked as intended, in the high-stakes
conditions, 76% of participants in the high-conflict condition indicated the level of conflict the
actor exhibited was “just about right” compared to only 44% of participants in the low-conflict
condition (χ2(1) = 7.43, p < .01). Conversely, in the low-stakes conditions, only 30% of the
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participants in the high-conflict condition indicated the level of conflict the actor exhibited was
“just about right” compared to 74% of participants in the low-conflict condition (χ2(1) = 14. 3, p
< .001).

APPENDIX F. STUDY 4b: POSTTEST

The goal of this posttest was to further explore why participants’ preferences did not
converge to those of an actor who was emotionally conflicted over the low-stakes decision (i.e.,
boxes containing $200,000 or $150,000). Based on our conceptual framework there are two main
possibilities for why preferences did not converge in this condition. The first possibility is that
participants did not empathize with the conflicted actor. The second possibility is that although
participants did empathize with the conflicted actor, they had difficulty feeling a sense of shared
identity with an actor that behaved in a very different manner than how they themselves would
have behaved. This posttest explores whether preference convergence in this case attenuated due
to the lack of empathy or not.

Method
We recruited 200 paid, online subjects to participate in the study (2 of whom had
incomplete responses and were therefore eliminated from the analyses). The procedure was
identical to that employed in Study 4b and participants were randomly assigned to one of the
four condition in this 2 (actor’s conflict: high vs. low) x 2 (stakes: high vs. low) between-subjects
design. After participants learned about the actor’s conflict level, we measured their empathic
reactions and sense of shared identity with the actor. Specifically, participants indicated on a 1-7
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scale ranging from not at all to extremely the extent to which they felt each of the following six
emotions toward the actor when learning about the decision he faced: Sympathy, Softhearted,
Warm, Compassionate, Tender, and Moved (Batson et al. 1997). The items were highly
correlated (αCronbach = .96) and were therefore collapsed to form a single measure of empathy.
Then, we measured participants’ sense of shared identity with the actor using the IOS scale
(Aron, Aron, and Smollan 1992).

Results
A two-way ANOVA first revealed participants generally empathized more with an actor
that faced a high-stakes decision regardless of the conflict level he exhibited (F(1,194) = 24.4, p
< .001). Importantly, the analysis revealed the expected interaction between conflict level and
decision stakes (F(1,194) = 11.3, p < .001). Planed contrasts indicated that when observing an
actor debating about a high-stakes decision, participants empathized with this actor more when
observing his high (as opposed to low) decisional conflict (Mhigh conflict = 4.79, Mlow conflict = 4.05,
t(1,99) = 2.62, p < .01). However, such effect was not observed (and even reversed) when
observing the actor debating about a low-stakes decision. Specifically, when observing the actor
choosing between two boxes that both contained high monetary rewards, this actor’s high
conflict did not trigger empathy, and even reduced it significantly (Mhigh conflict = 2.92, Mlow conflict
= 3.69, t(1,95) = -2.19, p < .03).
As expected, a similar pattern of results emerged when examining participants’ sense of
shared identity with the actor. Consistent with the way empathic reactions trigger sense of shared
identity, a two-way ANOVA revealed that participants had a greater sense of shared identity
with an actor that faced a high-stakes decision regardless of the conflict level he exhibited
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(F(1,194) = 17.77, p < .001). Importantly, the analysis revealed a significant interaction between
conflict level and decision stakes (F(1,194) = 12.01, p < .001). Planed contrasts indicated that
when observing an actor debating about a high-stakes decision, participants felt a greater sense
of shared identity with this actor when observing his high (as opposed to low) decisional conflict
(Mhigh conflict = 4.47, Mlow conflict = 3.6, t(1,99) = 2.56, p < .02). However, such effect was not
observed (and even reversed) when observing the actor debating about a low-stakes decision.
Specifically, when observing the actor choosing between two boxes that both contained high
monetary rewards, this actor’s high conflict did not trigger a greater sense of shared identity, and
even reduced it significantly (Mhigh conflict = 2.59, Mlow conflict = 3.42, t(1,95) = -2.34, p < .02).
Thus, other than providing additional convergent evidence for the effect of conflict cue
on empathy and shared identity, the results also give us better understanding of why in some
cases observed decisional conflict will not trigger convergence. Specifically, we found that
observers do not empathize with a conflicted actor if they perceive his conflict as unwarranted.

APPENDIX G. STUDY 6: OBSERVED CONFLICT AND CONVERGENCE AT THE
ATTRIBUTE-LEVEL SPACE

The studies reported in the main text explored convergence of preferences by examining
whether the ultimate choice of the observer converged to that of the actor. The current study
employed a different paradigm and examined whether we would also observe convergence of
preferences at the attribute level (i.e., attribute-importance weights). This investigation is
important for two main reasons. First, in some decision contexts, alternatives are described as a
set of attributes; thus, exploring whether convergence also occurs in these instances increases our
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findings’ generalizability. Second, measuring attribute weights enables us to investigate an
additional rival account, namely, perceived polarization of the actor’s preferences.

Method
Ninety-three undergraduate students from a private college in Israel participated in the
experiment as part of their course requirements (data for 3 participants were missing; we
therefore dropped these participants from the analysis). Participants were informed that the
purpose of the study was to test a new system aimed at helping students in the college share
information and recommendations about different topics. Participants then read a description of a
decision a fellow student ostensibly made. Participants learned the student was trying to choose
between two job opportunities, and they received information about each job (described on 7
attributes, e.g., salary, reputation, commute, etc.; the full description of the stimuli is available at
the end of this appendix). We then randomly assigned participants to one of two conditions (low
vs. high conflict) in which they were informed about the level of conflict the student experienced
prior to making the decision. In the low-conflict condition, we informed participants that the
choice of job was relatively easy for the student and that the student took two minutes to finalize
his choice. In the high-conflict condition, we informed participants that the choice of job was
very difficult for the student, that the student changed his mind several times, and that he took
about two weeks to finalize his choice. Thus, the study employed a single-factor, two-level (lowvs. high-conflict cue), between-subjects design.
After reading the description of the choice process, participants learned which of the
available alternatives the student eventually chose (held constant across conditions). Next, as a
measure of a sense of shared identity, participants indicated the degree to which they identified
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with the student and could put themselves in the student’s shoes on a 1-11 scale ranging from not
at all to very much. Thereafter, as a measure for preference convergence, participants indicated
(i) the likelihood of choosing the same option if faced with a similar decision (on a 1-11 scale
ranging from extremely low to extremely high) and (ii) the degree to which they believed their
preferences were similar to those of the student who made the choice (on a 1-11 scale ranging
from extremely dissimilar to extremely similar). These two items were highly correlated (r = .8, p
< .001) and we collapsed them to construct a similarity-in-preference variable.
Finally, participants indicated, for each of the seven attributes, (i) the extent to which
they believed the attribute was important for the student and (ii) the extent to which each
attribute was important for them when choosing their preferred job (all on a 1-11 scale ranging
from extremely unimportant to extremely important). These measures served as an additional
indication of preference similarity at the attribute level.

Results
The Effect of Observed Cconflict. A one-way ANOVA revealed that participants assigned
to the high-conflict condition identified with the actor more than those assigned to the lowconflict condition (Mhigh-conflict = 7.79 vs. Mlow-conflict = 6.36; F(1,88) = 5.34, p < .03). Further,
participants’ preferences converged more in the high-conflict condition than in the low-conflict
condition (Mhigh-conflict = 8.00 vs. Mlow-conflict = 6.92; F(1,88) = 3.68, p < .06).
Mediation Analysis. The data were submitted to a mediation analysis (using the macro
PROCESS, model 4, Hayes 2013). The 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect confirmed
the mediating role of identification in the relation between conflict level and preference
similarity (B = .61; CI95% = .12 to 1.3). The results indicated the direct effect of conflict on
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preference similarity became non-significant (B = .46, p > .36) when we controlled for
identification, thus suggesting full mediation.
Attribute Weights. A more stringent test for preference convergence was also performed
by examining the difference in how important participants perceived each attribute to be to the
actors and to themselves. We calculated a measure of perceived difference (Di) for each subject
as follows:
!

𝐷i =

𝑊!" − 𝑆!"

!

!!!

where Wia denotes subject i's estimation of how important attribute a was for the actor, and Sia
denotes subject i's own importance ratings of attribute a. Because we are interested in the overall
distance between own and other importance ratings, we took the squared term of this difference
for each attribute and summed across all seven attributes.
As expected, the average difference in importance ratings (Di) for participants assigned
to the high-conflict condition was lower than for those assigned to the low-conflict condition
(Dhigh conflict = 10.3, Dlow conflict = 14.68; a Mann-Whitney non-parametric U test rejected the null, p
< .03), indicating that participants who observed a conflicted (as opposed to non-conflicted)
actor felt their own attribute weights were closer to those of the actor.
Alternative Account. An alternative account for the observed pattern of results might
suggest that participants’ preferences did not converge in the high-conflict condition but rather
diverged in the low-conflict condition. In particular, observing a non-conflicted actor may have
prompted the inference that this actor had polarized preferences. For example, the actor may care
strongly about a single attribute and therefore, when confronted with the two options, have had
an easy choice. That is, the actor easily chose the option that was superior on this single attribute
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that is of high importance. Such an inference would presumably rationalize to the observer the
actor’s quick and easy decision. In addition, if respondents generally perceive their own
preferences as non-polarized and coming from the middle of the population distribution (i.e.,
false-consensus effect, Ross, Greene, and House 1977), this perception might explain the lower
perceived similarity in preferences for subjects assigned to the low-conflict condition. To address
this potential account, we performed an auxiliary analysis.
If participants assigned to the low-conflict condition indeed perceived the actor’s
preferences as more polarized, we should observe differences in the degree of perceived
polarization across the two conditions. We calculated a measure of perceived polarization Pi for
each subject as follows:
!

𝑃i =

|𝑊𝑖𝑎 – M|
!!!

where Wia denotes subject i's estimation of the decision maker’s importance of attribute a, and M
denotes the scale’s midpoint (a scalar equals 6).
We averaged the polarization measures (Pi) across respondents in each conflict condition.
A non-parametric test (Mann-Whitney U) failed to reject the null hypothesis and indicated the
distribution of the polarization index was not significantly different across the low- and highconflict conditions (UMann-Whitney = 1,013.5, p > .98), casting serious doubt on the claim that
inferences regarding the actor’s polarized preferences drove the observed pattern of results.

Discussion
The results of Study 6 provide further support for the main hypothesis that observers’
preferences tend to converge to those of the actor when the latter experiences higher conflict
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during his or her deliberation phase. Furthermore, the results show that the impact of perceived
conflict on the convergence of preferences is mediated by the extent to which the observer
identifies with the actor. Participants who were informed about the actor’s high decisional
conflict tended to identify with the actor more and were more likely to choose a similar option
when facing the same decision.

STUDY 6: DESCRIPTION OF STIMULI
Description of Option A
-‐ A company with a very good reputation in its field
-‐ The position offers a full-time employment
-‐ Most of the activity is done at the office and the position demands relatively routine work
-‐ The working environment is very competitive
-‐ Distance from the student’s home: 20 km [12.4 miles]
-‐ 14 paid vacation days
-‐ Monthly salary of 9,000 NIS [~$2500]
Description of Option B
-‐ A company with a very good reputation in its field
-‐ The position offers a full-time employment
-‐ Most of the activity is done outside of the office and in the field
-‐ The working environment is very collaborative
-‐ Distance from the student’s home: 20 km [12.4 miles]
-‐ 7 paid vacation days
-‐ Monthly salary of 7,000 NIS [~$2000] + additional bonus monthly salary
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